

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN  
SOUTHERN DIVISION

MICHAEL ALAN GRAY,

Petitioner,

CASE NO. 1:15-CV-668

v.

HON. ROBERT J. JONKER

BONITA HOFFNER,

Respondent.

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**ORDER APPROVING AND ADOPTING  
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION**

The Court has reviewed Magistrate Judge Kent's Report and Recommendation (docket # 3) and Petitioner's Objections to Report and Recommendation (docket # 7). Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, where, as here, a party has objected to portions of a Report and Recommendation, "[t]he district judge . . . has a duty to reject the magistrate judge's recommendation unless, on de novo reconsideration, he or she finds it justified." 12 WRIGHT, MILLER, & MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3070.2, at 381 (2d ed. 1997). Specifically, the Rules provide that:

The district judge to whom the case is assigned shall make a de novo determination upon the record, or after additional evidence, of any portion of the magistrate judge's disposition to which specific written objection has been made in accordance with this rule. The district judge may accept, reject, or modify the recommended decision, receive further evidence, or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

FED R. CIV. P. 72(b). De novo review in these circumstances requires at least a review of the evidence before the Magistrate Judge. *Hill v. Duriron Co.*, 656 F.2d 1208, 1215 (6th Cir. 1981).

The Court has reviewed de novo the claims and evidence presented to the Magistrate Judge; the Report and Recommendation itself; and Petitioner's objections. After its review, the Court finds that Magistrate Judge correctly concluded that Petitioner's petition is barred by the one-year statute of limitations.

Petitioner contends that his petition is not time-barred because, in Petitioner's view, either tolling under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) applies to the period during which Petitioner's second motion for relief from judgment was pending, or the filing of the second motion for relief from judgment rendered the original judgment non-final. Petitioner's objections fail to deal in a persuasive way with the Magistrate Judge's analysis. The Magistrate Judge properly found that tolling under Section 2244(d)(2) does not apply to the period during which the second motion for relief from judgment was pending, because Petitioner's second motion for relief from judgment was not a "*properly filed* application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim." 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(2) (emphasis added); *see also Williams v. Birkett*, 670 F.3d 729, 733 (6th Cir. 2012); *Rodriguez v. McQuidgen*, No. 08-CV-1326, 2009 WL 2742004, at \*3 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 25, 2009). To the extent Petitioner asserts that filing a second motion for relief from judgment rendered the original judgment non-final, Petitioner is simply mistaken. The petition is time-barred, for precisely the reasons the Report and Recommendation describes.

Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), a petitioner may not appeal in a habeas corpus case unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1). The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure extend to district judges the authority to issue certificates of appealability. FED. R. APP. P. 22(b); *see also, Castro v. United*

*States*, 310 F.3d 900, 901-02 (6th Cir. 2002) (the district judge “must issue or deny a [certificate of appealability] if an applicant files a notice of appeal pursuant to the explicit requirements of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 22(b)(1)”). However, a certificate of appealability may be issued “only if the applicant has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2).

To obtain a certificate of appealability, Petitioner must demonstrate that “reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 338 (2003) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). While Petitioner is not required to establish that “some jurists would grant the petition for habeas corpus,” he “must prove ‘something more than an absence of frivolity’ or the existence of mere ‘good faith.’” *Id.* (quoting *Barefoot v. Estelle*, 463 U.S. 880, 893 (1983)). In this case, Petitioner has not made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. Therefore, he is not entitled to a certificate of appealability.

The Magistrate Judge properly concluded that Petitioner is not entitled to the habeas corpus relief he seeks. Petitioner is not entitled to a certificate of appealability. Accordingly, **IT IS ORDERED** that the Report and Recommendation of the Magistrate Judge (docket # 3) is **APPROVED AND ADOPTED** as the opinion of the Court.

**IT IS FURTHER ORDERED** that:

1. Petitioner’s Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus (docket # 1) is **DISMISSED**; and
2. Petitioner is **DENIED** a certificate of appealability.

Dated: March 14, 2016

/s/ Robert J. Jonker  
ROBERT J. JONKER  
CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE